This is, in part, because of its rather drab character. Three years earlier, the Court had construed the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to preempt a municipality's effort to condition renewal of a taxi cab franchise on the franchisee's settlement of a pending labor dispute.' 0 On remand, the lower federal courts obediently required franchise reinstatement, but they refused to award compensatory damages, holding that section 1983 was inapplicable to this preemption claim." The Supreme Court reversed the section 1983 holding. 12 While disclaiming as "obviously ... incorrect" any assertion that all federal preemption claims could be asserted under section 1983, a 6-3 majority found that the "federal right" created by the NLRA itself could be so enforced.' is not restricted to enforcing federal statutes providing for equal rights. Golden State magnifies Thiboutot's importance; despite its 'disclaimer, Golden State confirms a general framework for section 1983 that authorizes its sweeping use not only in the preemption context but also in any case in which the plaintiff can establish the existence of a "federal right."' 6 This is a matter of considerable importance given the Court's increasing resistance to implying rights of action from federal statutes.
7
Golden State's important implications for the scope of section 1983 alone warrant a careful analysis, and this is the focus of Part I. Part II uses the division within the Golden State Court as a background against which to examine the uncertainty and confusion in the taxonomy and categories of analysis that sometimes surround judicial enforcement of duties imposed by federal substantive law. It discusses the need to esneither the Territory of Guam nor a territorial official is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. 10. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 615-19 (1986) (relying largely upon 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) Ct. 444 (1989) .
12. See 110 S. Ct. at 452. 14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) . 15. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
16.
Wilder extended the logic of Golden State beyond the preemption context. In Wilder, the entire Court functioned within the Golden State framework. The Wilder dissent was confined almost entirely to the narrow issue of whether the Boren Amendment conferred any substantive rights on health care providers. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2527 (1990) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The dissent suggests by implication, however, that the dissenting justices may not be willing to apply Golden State expansively.
17. See infra notes 91, 96 and accompanying text.
tablish both a primary and remedial right in order to secure relief. Finally, in Part III Golden State is compared with judicial review under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").' 8 Section 1983 is customarily thought of as a "constitutional tort" statute. 19 But that vision is incomplete. Often section 1983 operates simply as a way of determining whether state officials have complied with federal statutory norms-and here the analogue is section 702, in which the issue is whether federal (rather than state) officials have transgressed federal statutory norms. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 20 decided on the final day of the 1989 Term, shows that, despite considerable differences in the operative legal vocabulary, a framework parallel to that established by Golden State for review of action by state officials under section 1983 has emerged for APA review under section 702. In each context the Court must determine whether public officials have violated federal statutory duties of which the plaintiffs are "intended" rather than "incidental" beneficiaries.
I. THE GOLDEN STATE DECISION
Although the Court in Golden State decided that a federal preemption claim was enforceable under section 1983, the dissent was troubled that a federal immunity could constitute a "right" within the meaning of section 1983. But the weaknesses inherent in the dissent's analysis raise important issues that are fundamental to any inquiry into the availability of rights of action under section 1983. Golden State is usefully approached, therefore, by first examining the dissenting opinion of Justice Kennedy and then turning to the opinion for the Court authored by Justice Stevens.
A. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
For Justice Kennedy, a claim of immunity from state action based solely upon a federal statute's preemptive effect does not create a "right" within the meaning of section 1983 because section 1983 does not include immunities resulting "solely" from the division of power in the federal system. His analysis is problematic, however, because he assumes that the district court in Golden State had the authority to grant injunctive relief, but not damages. Yet unless a right of action arose under section 1983 or was implied from the NLRA, it is not clear that the district court had "arising under" jurisdiction, 2 1 and thus any au-18. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988 Monroe's natural tort analogue at the federal level.
20. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) .
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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thority to enjoin the federally preempted conduct. Drawing upon the celebrated analytical framework constructed by Professor Hohfeld in his series of articles beginning with Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 22 Justice Kennedy characterized the preemption claim as a simple claim of a federal "immunity":
The city's lack of power gives rise to a correlative legal interest in [plaintiff] that we did not discuss in [our previous decision].
The majority has chosen to call the interest a right. I would prefer to follow the familiar Hohfeldian terminology and say that Golden State has an immunity from the city's interference with the NLRA. This terminology best reflects Congress' intent to create [a] free zone of bargaining .... 23 Justice Kennedy recognized that, in terms, section 1983 embraces " 'the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' "24 But, for him, the "immunity" conferred by the NLRA was not one "secured" within the meaning of section 1983 because this statute does not protect "those interests merely resulting from the allocation of power between the State and Federal Governments." 25 Justice Kennedy's appeal to the Hohfeldian distinction between rights and immunities cannot carry him very far. The Hohfeldian categories (as we shall see) lack resolving power; 26 they are entirely formal and descriptive. 2 7 Accordingly, they cannot inform the crucial substantive decision whether a federal immunity claim can be asserted affirmatively. Because that determination turns solely on the wishes of Congress, 28 justice Kennedy was quickly forced to undertake a detailed examination of section 1983's legislative history and the Court's cases construing the statute. 29 The necessity for examination of the meaning of the relevant statute, not Hohfeld, is clarified by analogy to other fed- the Court said that a "plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve." ' 42 But if Shaw and similar decisions are read to establish the district courts' authority to award relief to nondamages-seeking, federal preemption plaintiffs, they provide no explanation for their result.
The difficulty with both Shaw and Justice Kennedy's dissent in Golden State, is the source of subject matter jurisdiction. Shaw did posit a distinction between plaintiffs claiming preemption, for whom jurisdic- Cir. 1990 ), both of the courts noted the apparent conflict between Wycoff and Shaw and followed Shaw. The court's approach in Playboy Enterprises is particularly puzzling for declaratory and injunctive relief. Unless Congress otherwise directs, as it has in various removal statutes, 5 ' generally the plaintiff must assert a right to sue in order to establish "arising under" jurisdiction.
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That is, a plaintiff asserting a substantive federal immunity-or even a federal primary right-must also assert a remedial right of action. 53 This rule has been relaxed to the extent that the Court seems willing to permit declaratory judgment suits without insisting upon a right of action when the defendant could have maintained a coercive suit under federal law. 54 , But, of course, even if the DeclaratoryJudgment Act permits party realignment and alteration in the timing of an otherwise proper federal court suit, that exception is not broad enough to explain jurisdiction in cases such as Shaw in which plaintiffs seek access to federal courts based solely on their own federal immunities. 55 The plaintiff in Golden State surely satisfied the standard established under Bell v. Hood 56 and its progeny that a colorable claim of a federal right of action suffices to establish "arising under" jurisdiction. 57 But even if subject matter jurisdiction would exist for the plaintiff to seek an because it went on to find that § 1983 was applicable. See 906 F.2d at 31. If so, there is no doubt that arising under jurisdiction exists. [Vol. 91:233 injunction, Kennedy's assertion that a remedy other than relief under section 1983 would be available seems unjustified. To obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must do more than establish a colorable claim: a right of action must actually be established before injunctive relief is appropriate. 58 For example, California v. Sierra Club 5 9 was a suit by an environmental organization and several of its members to enjoin construction of a state water project as a violation of a federal statutory prohibition on unauthorized waterway obstructions. Presumably, the complaint satisfied the requirements of Bell v. Hood. After extended analysis, though, the Court concluded that the relevant federal statute did not confer a private right of action on the plaintiffs. 60 The Court then declined an invitation to address the merits of the controversy notwithstanding this defect: "we cannot consider the merits of a claim which Congress has not authorized [plaintiffs] to raise." 61 Unless Justice Kennedy assumed that the Golden State plaintiffs possessed an implied right of action under the NLRA, his denial of a right of action under section 1983 would have left the plaintiffs without a remedy in the federal courts, despite his assertions to the contrary.
B. Justice Stevens's Opinion: The Search for a Federal "Right"
The Court's opinion in Golden State, written by Justice Stevens, deserves careful attention from three perspectives: first, its emphasis on the importance of an underlying federal right; second, its rejection of any attempt to formulate a general exclusion from section 1983 of interests that are the "sole result" of preemption; and finally, the extended reach of section 1983 confirmed, if not established, by the decision.
Analytically, the Court's opinion contains much that is satisfying. The entire opinion is cast in terms of a judicial hunt for a "federal right," which is consistent with section 1983's focus on the "deprivation of any rights" secured by federal law, and the statute's provision of 58. Declaratory judgments and injunctions are simply remedies. The Declaratory Judgment Act has obscured this fact because one of its principal uses is to obtain negative declarations-in that respect it enlarges upon the office of the injunction. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 573 n.41 (1947) (declaratory judgments not subject to remedial limitations governing injunctions, such as proof of irreparable injury). 
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a "remedy [that] encompasses violations of ... [such] rights. '6 2 The Court recognizes that while section 1983 "must be broadly construed," the preemption plaintiff nonetheless "must assert the violation of a federal right." ' 63 Apparently, section 1983's additional references to "privileges or immunities" secured by federal law refer to claims that in some important way also possess the structure of "rights." This concern with the contours of a federal right is quite understandable and has its roots, in part, in article III's "case or controversy" requirement. Courts do not confer discretionary benefits; a case requires that the plaintiff assert a claim of right. 64 This means, as the Court correctly recognized, that a plaintiff seeking access to a federal court must assert more than that the federal statute expresses a congressional "preference";65 the plaintiff must assert an interest sufficiently specific to be capable of judicial enforcement. If violation of a federal "right" can be established, section 1983 is available, the Court said, unless Congress has " 'specifically foreclosed a remedy [thereunder] .' "67 The Court then undertook an inquiry for the requisite right. 68 In a single sentence the Court denied that the supremacy clause itself could constitute a general source of rights en- This reasoning led to the following formulation:
In all cases, the availability of the § 1983 remedy turns on whether the statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations "sufficiently specific and definite" to be .within "the competence of the judiciary to enforce," Wright, 479 U.S., at 432 .... is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not [specifically] foreclosed .... 71 Turning to the task of applying these principles, the Court found that the "nub of the controversy" turned on whether the NLRA created "rights" in labor and management that are "protected . . .against governmental interference," 7 2 and it answered that question affirmatively.
73
The Court is surely correct that federal statutory preemption of state action "does not preclude the possibility that the same statute may create a federal right for which § 1983 provides a remedy." But care must be taken to see the precise work that the concept of "right" does here. Congress could confine assertion of a federal immunity claim to a defense in a state law enforcement proceeding; indeed, federal preemption claims often work precisely that way. 
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federal immunity shield with the character of a sword-unconstrained by legal abstractions such as "rights" and "immunities." Congress need only make clear its will. 75 As section 1983 itself shows, terms such as "rights" are the familiar staples of the legal structure and are frequently employed by Congress. Without contrary Congressional direction, courts should be expected to interpret legislation within the familiar framework. But more specifically, when a section 1983 action is filed in a federal court, that court's recognition of a federal "right" will be important in two ways: in Golden State, for example, the existence of a federal "right" under the NLRA meant jurisdictionally that "arising under" jurisdiction was incontestable; 76 substantively, it allowed for the award of damages and attorneys fees.
77
C. Scope of the Golden State Decision 1. Of Personal Rights and Federalism. -In Golden State, the Court stated that "it would obviously be incorrect" to conclude that section 1983 is available "every time a federal rule of law preempts state regulatory authority." This conclusion followed, the Court said, because of "the variety of situations in which preemption claims may be asserted, in state and in federal court .... "78 Seemingly, this perception would instruct the Court that in each case judicial consideration must be focused upon context-specific factors such as the extent to which affirmative challenges would disrupt state programs and the need for affirmative enforcement. Instead, however, the Court immediately fashioned a general approach that is unconnected to any of the restrictive implications of its reasoning: unless specifically displaced, section 1983 is available to any plaintiff with a federal right to enforce federally established legal duties. Put differently, despite its disclaimer, the Court does not treat preemption claims differently from any other claims raised by a section 1983 plaintiff.
At the center of the differences between the dissent and the Court is Justice Kennedy's effort to distinguish the treatment of preemptive claims from other section 1983 claims. In each case, the plaintiff seeks damages complaining that state officials have interfered with a federally secured right to be let alone. Justice Kennedy seems to have unconsciously assumed that the interests protected by the common law of torts (at issue in Monroe) implicate section 1983 but not those protected by the, common law of contracts (at issue in Golden State). Why that should be so is never made clear in his opinion. More fundamentally, in seeking to identify interests that are "the sole result" of federal preemption, Justice Kennedy fails to recognize that every claim against state officials based upon federal regulatory or entitlement law is, in the end, "the sole result" of federal preemption. If the otherwise applicable state rule (a rule of no recovery) is displaced, it is only because it has been displaced by valid federal law. Stripped of historical support, Justice Kennedy needs some theory to support his distinctions. That theory will be hard to come by; indeed no coherent theory seems plausible. Consider in this context the question to be argued in Dennis v. Higgins: 86 whether section 1983 is available to vindicate a dormant commerce clause claim. Presumably, for Justice Kennedy the "immunity" conferred by the clause is not "secured" by section 1983; the commerce clause is concerned with the appropriate distribution of power between the nation and the state and thus does not involve the kinds of personal rights embraced by section 1983. But the "and thus" is a non sequitur; the purported dichotomy between distribution of power and personal rights issues is illusory. For the Framers and well into the nineteenth century the power-allocating provisions of the national constitution (federalism and separation of powers) were thought to be important structures for maximizing individual liberty. 88 If Hospital Association, 9 3 both the Court and the dissent render explicit what Golden State assumed: section 1983's availability turns only on whether federal statutory law creates a "primary" right, even though the federal law does not otherwise establish a "remedial" right (i.e., a right of action). In a footnote in Wilder, the Court noted that the availability of section 1983 presents "a different inquiry" from that involved in implied right of action analysis. 9 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, agreed on this point. He observed that the Court's section 1983 jurisprudence in effect reduced Cort v. Ash's four factors to its first: did the "statute[] contain a right 'in favor of' the particular plaintiff." 95 This observation serves to highlight Golden State's importance because judicial resistance is hardening against implication of rights of action.
96
Golden State thus "completes the process of divorcing section 1983 from its historical [and rights] roots and directs the focus of future cases away from the availability of a section 1983 cause of action and toward the scope of the right asserted under a particular constitutional or statutory provision." 9 7 Section 1983 is, of course, unavailable if Congress has "specifically" foreclosed the remedy. 98 But both Golden State and Wilder shore up the intimations in prior case law that this limitation is exceedingly narrow. 9 9 Implied preemption of a section 1983 remedy on the basis of the assertedly comprehensive nature of the remedial scheme created by the federal legislation is not favored; indeed, Wilder pointedly observed that "only on two occasions" had the Court held that the section 1983 remedy was foreclosed on these grounds. 10 0 Golden State closes any Hohfeldian gap between primary federal statutory rights and section 1983 rights of action. The latter follows simply from the existence of the former. Apart from article III's requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability,' 0 o the only limiting principle on the apparent sweep of section 1983 in enforcing federal legal obligations is the Court's statement in Golden State that section 1983 "may not be available" when the plaintiffs are benefited "only as an incident of the federal scheme of regulation."'1 0 2 "May not" is more than that; as Wilder demonstrates, whether a plaintiff is categorized as an intended or an incidental beneficiary determines whether or not that plaintiff has a primary federal right. l03 We must therefore determine whether the Boren Amendment creates a "federal right" that is enforceable under § 1983.
Unless itself foreclosed
Such an inquiry turns on whether "the provision in question was intend [ed] to benefit the putative plaintiff." . . . If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects merely a "congressional preference" for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit, .... or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is "too vague and amorphous" such that it is "'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' "104 The term "right" contained in section 1983, therefore, expresses the crucial conclusions with respect to whom are owed the legal duties created by federal statutes.
II. OF PRIMARY AND REMEDIAL LAW
Golden State's search for an underlying "federal right" draws not only on section 1983's explicit language but on currents deeply embedded in our legal and political culture. Apostolic authority instructs us 103. To the extent that the distinction between intended and incidental beneficiaries depends upon a determination of congressional intent, it may impose quite a significant limit on the availability of § 1983 after Golden' State. See, for example, the reasoning of the Wilder dissent, infra note 104.
104. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2517 (citations omitted). In Wilder, the Court divided 5-4 on whether the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act created legal rights in health care providers. Apparently acknowledging that the amendment created legal obligations, the dissent denied that it conferred "any substantive rights on Medicaid services providers." Id. at 2527 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). They were simply incidental beneficiaries of any legal obligations established by the amendment, which were matters between the state and national government alone. The dissent also argued that if any private rights were created, they were of a procedural, not substantive, nature. See id.
[Vol. 91:233 that "the province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."' 1 0 5 More important here, the judicial fixation on a search for and articulation of the relevant "federal right" is an analytic approach that not only has powerful cultural appeal but also is quite useful for the concrete needs at hand. 1 0 6 Nonetheless, uncertain use of familiar legal terms can cause unnecessary confusion. For example, "cause of action" is a term thought to possess such intractable difficulties that it was banished from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 7 Of course, the effort failed; the term persists in the working vocabulary of lawyers and judges with the tenacity of original sin.1 0 8 More to the point here, the term "right" is susceptible to particular uncertainty because it is "incorrigibly multifarious in actual usage."' 1 9 For example, to state that A has no right against B may carry either of two different meanings: A lacks a primary right against B, or A has such a primary right but no remedial right. Thus, an important distinction exists between primary and remedial law.
A. Primary Law
Primary law concerns the "authoritative directive arrangements"-or more simply, the legal rules-that govern persons independently of litigation."1 0 In this domain, concepts such as "rights," "duties," "immunities," and "powers" simply describe the various "characteristic positions" held by persons in relationship to one another."' "Duty" plays a pivotal role: active in character, this term describes the position of a person who is legally required to act, not to act, or to act only in a certain way. 1 2 Surprisingly, perhaps, at first blush "primary right" seems to be a theoretically uninteresting concept: wholly passive, it simply mirrors the primary duty. "[A] 'right,' if spoken of with Hohfeldian accuracy, is a position which a person has because someone else has a duty in the performance of which the right-holder is ... inter- Rev. 1989 Rev. , 1991 Rev. -95 (1990 In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we have considered whether the provision in question creates obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather "does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment." The interest the plaintiff asserts must not be "too vague and amorphous" to be "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." We have also asked whether the provision in question was "inten[ded] to benefit" the putative plaintiff. 15 The Court's reasoning correctly assumes the need to establish both (a) the existence of a legal obligation, and (b), the "persons" to whom the obligation is owed: the "what" and the "to whom." The latter can be one person, several, or the entire population. From this perspective, the judicial concern with primary right draws attention to the "to whom" issue-the persons who in a legally cognizable sense are "interested" in the duty holder's discharge of his obligations. The effort (exemplified in both Golden State and Wilder) is to capture a distinction between those who are "incidental" beneficiaries of federal programs imposing duties and those who are intentionally protected. To be sure, this inquiry can be, and has been, extracted from the concept of duty-A owes a duty to B but not to C-but the Court's inquiry into the federal "right" is a way of highlighting the important fact that duties imposed by federal law are not necessarily owed to the public at large.
The word federal is properly underscored, at least initially. One could argue that the American political tradition supports, even though it may not require, a theory of judicial recognition of federal primary rights more restrictive than that applied at the state law level.
1 6 This position might be defended as a residual aspect of our constitutional tradition of a national government of (theoretically) limited powers, or, perhaps more persuasively, as expressive of an appropriate federal ju- [Vol. 91:233 dicial role grounded in separation of powers concerns. Any such contention is, however, misplaced. Claims of excessive judicial lawmaking made in the context of criticizing the propriety of implying rights of action 117 seem unpersuasive: perhaps judicial establishment of new primary duties invades the legislative prerogative, but fashioning remedial rights hardly seems to rise to that level. In any event, whatever the merits of implying a right of action, this dispute has no relevance to deciding whether the legislature has created a primary right.
When both the duty and a general right of action (section 1983) have been established by Congress, no persuasive claim of excessive lawmaking exists because the Court discharges an ancient task in determining whether A is an intended, rather than an incidental, beneficiary."1 8 In the area of primary rights, there seems to be no reason to impose unusual restrictions on the courts that interpret the will of Congress.
B. Remedial Law
Section 1983 is, of course, an express right of action, and Golden State and Wilder close the gap between primary right and remedial right, making the existence of the former determinative of the existence of the latter. 1 9 This development is important because the existence of a primary right entails no necessary conclusion that the right holder can sue. 120 To sue, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a remedial right, a right of action in the traditional language:' 2 1 A right of action is a species of power-of remedial power. It is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy. 118. In the Golden State situation, the existence vel non of the primary right determines whether a remedial right exists. See infra text accompanying note 119 But the remedial right, § 1983, was created by Congress, so the excessive lawmaking argument is inapplicable.
119. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. 120. Indeed, the violation of the duty may have no consequences even in an enforcement proceeding against the right holder. See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 110 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1990) .
121. The right of action might be expressly conferred, or it might be implied if the four criteria set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), are met. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
122. Hart & Sacks, supra note 109, at 154. Earlier, Hart and Sacks described a power as a situation in which the law offers a person "positive assistance" by imposing duties on others to respect the power-holder's decisions. "A power may be defined as a capacity, either singly or in concert with one or more others, to effect by a deliberative act a settlement of a question of group living which will be accepted and enforced by the official representatives of the group." Id. at 148-49.
But the beneficiary of a primary right may not possess a right of action: there may be no express action and one may not be implied; alternatively, any right of action may inhere only in a public official.
123
Distinguishing among rights, rights of action, and remedies helps illuminate some issues, particularly issues arising in the context of "Our Federalism." For example, in a diversity case how shall we understand the respective relationship between state and federal law? Clearly, both the underlying duty and the right of action are drawn from state law. But what of the remedy? It is possible, but rather awkward, to conceive of the federal court as awarding a "state law remedy." For me, the federal court simply supplies a federal remedy to enforce a state-created right of action. This formulation better captures our understanding that state law cannot authorize the award of remedies beyond those authorized by Congress, 12 4 but Congress may enlarge remedies beyond what state law authorizes.' 25 Similarly, section 1983 simply provides a minimum remedy, available in federal and state courts, to enforce many federally-created rights. 123. It is possible to argue that a primary right has little value if the right holder has no right of action and hence no power to enforce the right. In reality, however, the existence of the primary right generally presupposes some remedy against the duty holder for breach of duty, even though the right holder may not have a remedial "sword" himself. For example, before Bivens, fourth amendment rights were enforceable, not only as a "shield"-a defense to a criminal prosecution-but also under state law.
I should add here that judicial references to the existence of the "cause of action" created by section 1983 are operationally equivalent to the assertion that section 1983 is available because the plaintiff has claimed both the existence of a legal duty and a primary right in the plaintiff's favor. To that extent at least, the term's persistence is ordinarily quite harmless. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 Ct. , 2516 . Golden State should be compared with developments that have now taken hold in the area of standing under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to obtain judicial review of the compliance of federal officials with federal statutory commands.' 28 There is, however, a natural resistance to undertaking such a comparison. Our reflex is to think of section 1983 as involving trial oriented litigation in which plaintiffs seek damages caused by "constitutional torts" like assault, battery, and defamation, with issues of sovereign and official immunity sharply arising. On the other hand, APA review appears to involve the quite different task of judicial review of the compliance of federal officials with federal norms. In fact, however, as both Golden State and Wilder illustrate, much section 1983 litigation after Maine v. Thiboutot 129 is at bottom no more than judicial review of the compliance of state (rather than federal) officials with federal statutory norms. And in both cases the Court distinguishes between "intended" beneficiaries, who may sue, and "incidental" beneficiaries, who may not.
A. A Comparison Between Section 1983 and APA Section 702
To the extent that section 1983 functions like section 702, a methodological comparison is warranted. The most important barrier to that undertaking is the differences in the operative vocabulary. Section 702 replaces familiar section 1983 (Hohfeldian) terminology such as right, duty, and right of action with a provision stating that any "person suffering legal wrong.., or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency enforcing federal rights the state courts are not simply transformed into federal courts. Like state court jurisdiction and state court rules of procedure, the remedy awarded has its ground in state law: "federal law sets certain minimum [remedial] Ct. 2238 , which did not involve § 1983, but did stress the independent duty of state courts to provide remedies adequate to enforce federal constitutional commands: "The State is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined." Id. at 2258.
127. Lujan originated as a challenge by an environmental group to federal agency decisions permitting increased mining on public lands. After noting that no claim of an implied right of action had been made, the Court said that plaintiff's standing depended upon a demonstration that it was "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. . . .": 133 the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 396-397 . .. Thus, for example, the failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring "on the record" hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency's proceedings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company would not be "adversely affected within the meaning" of the statute.
4
This inquiry is substantially parallel to that required by Golden State: the section 1983 plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty of which she is an intended beneficiary.1 35 Clarke, cited by the Court in Lujan, had noted that the APA standing test is more liberal than the standard for implying a private right of action in cases in which the APA is inapplicable; the latter requires the plaintiff to show membership in a "class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 13 6 Although "especial" is not a requirement under section 702 of the APA (or of section 130. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988 1983),137 section 702 only confers standing to intended and not incidental beneficiaries. Lujan also imposed a causation requirement for APA standing comparable to the same inquiry in section 1983 actions. The Court found that although the litigants asserted the sorts of aesthetic and recreational use interests that the relevant federal statutes were designed to protect, and thus the plaintiffs were "intended beneficiaries," the record failed to show that those interests were affected by the specific agency action challenged. 38 Proof that the defendant's conduct caused injury to the plaintiff is, of course, also a long-recognized standing requirement in section 1983 actions. 1 39
The convergence of the two lines of decisions appears from another aspect of Lujan. The APA's "finality" requirement and settled rules governing ripeness bar premature challenges to governmental conduct. 140 More specifically, as the Court said in Lujan, ordinarily plaintiffs cannot bring wholesale challenges to agency misconduct or mismanagement; in most cases those who seek "wholesale improvement of [a governmental] program" must resort to "the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made."' 14 1 Here, too, APA review parallels developments in section 1983 litigation. The Court has some-but by no means complete-reluctance to permit plaintiffs to invoke section 1983 to bring systemic challenges to state governmental agencies on the ground that ing that their interests were arguably within the zone protected or regulated by" the statute in a claim under the APA. Id.
137 Cir. 1990 ) (distinguishing between ripeness, a judgemade prudential doctrine, and finality, ajurisdictional requirement). The ripeness and standing requirements are not entirely independent. See Currie, supra, at 44.
141. 110 S. Ct. at 3190. The Court added: Absent [statutory authority], however, a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action "ripe" for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is "ripe" for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided .... ) Id. The Court's initial reference to "regulation" seems out of place because the whole point of the suit was that there was no regulation, but the general point is clear. the agency is being mismanaged contrary to federal law. 14 2
Other symmetries exist. For example, the Court's requirement that a plaintiff's section 1983 claim assert more than a congressional preference and not be too open-ended for judicial enforcement resonates with APA cases refusing judicial review when "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."' 143 Furthermore, the case law shows a presumption of reviewability under the APA, but Congress can specifically foreclose review of federal agency action just as it may foreclose a section 1983 remedy.' 4 4
Of course, some differences remain, at least so far:' 45 section 702 does not itself authorize suits for damages without the consent of Congress, or for punitive damages.' 46 This distinction is not crucial when the real relief sought is declaratory or injunctive, and, in addition, the case turns on the meaning of the underlying federal statutes.' 4 7 But the distinction can matter. To be sure, doctrines of sovereign and official immunity make damages of any kind hard to obtain from public officials under section 1983 when the gist of the complaint is no more than that state officials have transgressed federal statutory com-mands.' 48 But public bodies below the state and its subdivisions hold no immunity from damage claims, and they may be held liable for the consequences of their seemingly official policies.1 4 9
Other differences also exist, most significantly with respect to the scope of review. The Chevron doctrine, which requires judicial deference to reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous statutes, 50 is not directly applicable to section 1983 actions. But in section 1983 actions based on violations of federal statutory law, I believe that courts should review actions by state officials who adhere to the construction given to federal statutes by the responsible federal administrative officials with the same deference under Chevron that would be applied in section 702 proceedings to review the federal official conduct. Nor is there any reason to believe that section 1983 actions against state officials for the violation of federal statutes would require a disregard of any administration record or of the APA's substantial evidence test, if otherwise appropriate.' 5 '
B. Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
Whatever the differences between section 1983 and section 702, Golden State and Wilder bring section 1983 criteria closer to APA standing rules when the issue is who may sue. Under both statutes not everyone can sue; something more than "injury in fact" must be established, however that term is defined. The availability of section 1983 turns on the distinction between direct and incidental beneficiaries.' 5 2 While at first blush the APA's "adversely affected" language may suggest a more I pragmatic and generous attitude toward permitting access by plaintiffs than that suggested by section 1983's "a federal right" language, that difference is, at best, likely to be marginal. 15 3 The section 702 litigant must still show that she is adversely affected "within the meaning of a relevant statute," a requirement that, after Lujan, seems identical to the Court's insistence in Golden State that the section 1983 plaintiff must establish that she is more than simply an "incidental" beneficiary of a federal statute. 15 4 That symmetrical approaches are taken in the two contexts is entirely justified because (so far as is relevant here) both are concerned with the same issue: determining who is a proper plaintiff when public officials (federal or state) have transgressed norms imposed by federal law.
The distinction between intended beneficiaries and bystanders has the appearance of a conventional legal question: what did Congress intend? No doubt there is much truth to such a characterization of the problem, but there is more to the matter than that. Judicial attitudes, often formed by deep but imperfectly conscious intuitions, will play a role, at least at the margins, in making this distinction. We can, accordingly, expect to see similar divisions in both section 1983 and APA section 702 cases over just who, legally, is only a "bystander."' 15 5 My own bias is toward ready access to the courts. I have never been persuaded that deep separation of powers concerns exist every time courts entertain suits by those hurt by administrative agencies to determine whether the injury-causing agency conduct was wrongful.
My bias aside, precedents developed under section 702 and section 1983 will, I suspect, prove to be interchangeable. Thus, persons who are subject to state regulation (as in Golden State and Wilder) contrary to federal law will readily be found to be right holders. 156 It seems unlikely, though, that the ultimate "beneficiaries" of federal regulatory the only proper litigant is a person asserting interests protected by the common law. 162 -But this characterization seems overdrawn. Judicial review is now available to whole categories of litigants who would have been barred by at least the early version of the private rights model. Moreover, APA section 702 and section 1983 review are open to plaintiffs asserting not only the traditional common law property interests but also, as Justice Kennedy acknowledges, the "New Property" interests created by the welfare state. 163 In addition, Lujan is inconsistent with this characterization; there the Court seemed quite willing to assume that aesthetic and recreational use interests were protected by the relevant federal statutes. 164
CONCLUSION
When the issue is whether a public official violated a federal statutory norm, the structure of the inquiry under section 1983 and section 702 of the APA is largely identical. Both analyses reflect the distinction between primary and remedial law that runs back to well before Hohfeld. In both cases, the Court must focus on inquiries of primary law: what were the duties, and who are the intended beneficiaries of the federal statutes from which the rights are derived. If these determinations are decided favorably to the plaintiff, section 1983 and APA section 702 review follow generally as a matter of course, as Golden State, Wilder, and Lujan demonstrate. And that, I submit, is how things should be.
ADDENDUM
